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ABSTRACT 
 
Using postcolonial analysis coupled with fieldwork in both Afghanistan and Nepal, I argue 
that contemporary colonial relations within private security make possible a gender and 
racial ordering of security contractors. This ordering of contractors results in vastly 
different conditions of possibilities depending on the contractors’ histories and 
nationalities. Empirically documenting perspectives from Gurkhas, constituted as racialised 
security contractors, this article contributes to the existing literatures in both private 
security and postcolonial studies by 1) providing a needed racial and gendered analysis 
from the position of the racialised security contractors, and 2) empirically documenting a 
growing subaltern group of men participating as security contractors.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Examining private military companies have been a growing field of study over the past 
decade and research on them has worked to expose gendered images of men and 
masculinities.i Some of these gendered representations of contractors are mentioned in 
ethnographic studies of security contractors, drawing a homogenous portrait of rugged, 
tough men who fight for money and for their nations’ values (Higate 2009; 2012a). Only 
recently have academics and journalists highlighted the growing participation in the 
industry from men in the global South.ii iii These scholars document how men from the 
global South take up poorly paid and unregulated work for the benefit of Western 
geopolitical polices and the overall security industry—an empirical point which speaks to 
existing feminist and international political economy scholarship discussing global South 
women’s labour and migration trends (Enloe 1989; Bakan and Stasiulis 2005; Gonzalez 
2007). However, while this work is important, it fails to explore how men positioned at the 
margins of this security industry make sense of their gendered experiences.1  
 
Gurkhas are among a variety of men from the global South who participate in private 
security as racialised contractors. The imagery of the Gurkha brings feelings of admiration 
to most UK citizens. Through popular narratives we are nostalgically reminded of the 
colonial military history of Gurkhas’ bravery, fierceness and loyalty to the British Empire. 
Their heroic pursuits and martial attributes are written about in numerous books detailing 
                                                 
 
  
the inhospitable terrains that make them hearty men who have brute strength and 
fortitude, yet obedient and courteous to authority due to their highly structured social 
attributes. iv These nostalgic images also play out in contemporary politics, highlighted in 
Joanna Lumley’s pursuit for Gurkhas’ settlement rights.  In the media depictions 
surrounding settlement rights, Gurkhas were seen as both fierce and brave and yet in need 
of guidance and help by their British counterparts. In this case, Lumley was narrated as a 
white daughter of a British Gurkha officer (BBC News 2009).  Silencing actual Gurkhas and 
their individual efforts, the Gurkha settlement rights became largely known in media 
depictions and photos as Lumley’s fight for the Gurkha. These narrations and images of 
Lumley in the forefront and Gurkhas in the background indicate that the colonial 
relationship between these men and the British is alive and well in contemporary politics.   
 
Colonial histories set the terms through which differences are constructed and experienced 
amongst men and women globally. Taking colonial histories seriously, I apply postcolonial 
analysis to my fieldwork in Afghanistan and Nepal. This analysis reveals the interplay 
between histories and current security markets that constitute a variety of security 
contractor subjects. In particular, I highlight three security subject positions: the high- and 
low-profile white Westerner contractors and the racialised Gurkha. Using material from 
interviews with Gurkhas working in private security, this article seeks to illuminate how 
Gurkhas make sense of their own subject positions and how they relate to their Western 
counterparts.   
  
INTERVIEWS AND METHODOLOGY 
  
 
The empirical material included in this article originates from interviews I conducted while 
in Afghanistan and Nepal between 2008 and 2010. All the Gurkha interviewees came into 
private security after working with the British Military, Indian Military or the Singaporean 
Police. They all are Nepalese and had been working in Afghanistan anywhere from a few 
months to many years. I have used aliases of those interviewed to protect their anonymity 
but have documented their background and experience. The informants quoted in this 
article are Barat, a private security contractor with Singaporean Police background; Fabien, 
an advocate for Gurkhas who is currently working in Kabul; Rabindra, a security contractor 
working in Kabul for only a few months and with six years’ experience in the Indian Army; 
Mohan, a former British Gurkha with various experience in private security throughout the 
Middle East; and Kavindra, Murhan and Baharder, all former Indian Army Gurkhas with 
various levels of experience in private security.  
 
The interviews were qualitative and in-depth, occurring in both individualised and focus 
group format. Importantly, these interviews are not meant to be an exhaustive 
documentation of a Gurkha experience (as if this experience could actually be captured). 
Instead, they are meant to shed light onto the racialised differences in living and working 
conditions and how the racialised contractors make sense of this difference. The empirical 
components of this article focus on three main threads discussed in the interviews. The 
first, entitled ‘Better to Die than be a Coward’ after the Gurkha motto, explores how the 
interviewees understand what it means to be a Gurkha and the meanings they attribute to 
this identity. The second, entitled ‘Almost but Not White’, is a quote taken from Homi 
  
Bhabha and explores how the Gurkhas interviewed make sense of their racialised subject 
positions and their conditions of possibilities within the security industry. The third, 
entitled ‘Moving Margins’, discusses the ways in which these men are transforming and 
shifting their life trajectories for themselves and their families.   
 
LOCATING RACIALISED MASCULINITIES IN PRIVATE SECURITY 
 
The security industry and the people participating in it are heavily gendered. As a starting 
point, private security work is made up of primarily men; to be a security contractor 
demands ‘manliness’ of different performances and understandings. The concept of 
masculinities helps us to reveal different material and discursive arrangements amongst 
gendered orders (Connell 2002; Higate 2009, 2012a). Understanding masculinities and 
men has been a concern for masculinities studies scholars for the past twenty-five years, 
and more recently for feminists and gender theorists.v Both feminist and masculinities 
literatures argue that social relations are configured through power processes shaping 
gender relations. Theorising men and masculinities has been illustrated through case 
studies depicting males as victims and women as embodying masculinities in male 
dominated or militarised environments, and through violence and political and social 
transitions.vi Through these studies, masculinities are shown to be one such identifier that 
helps us to understand why some men acquire power and have access to greater material 
resources than others. For most Western theorists who engage in masculinities studies, 
there is recognition of how masculinities are implicated in all aspects of sociality.vii 
 
  
In isolation, the concept of masculinities is insufficient to understand the complex and 
dynamic power relations founded in the representation and subjectivity of particular 
beings (Archer 2001; Morrell and Swart 2005), specifically with the use of third country 
nationals (TCNs) in Afghanistan and in situations where there are a growing number of 
people that are commonly represented in the security industry through their colonial 
histories (Sherman and DiDomenico 2009; Higate 2012c). Incorporating postcolonial 
analysis within masculinities studies offers a much more nuanced conceptual tool with 
which to understand some of the dynamics occurring amongst groups of security 
contractors. For many feminist and gender theorists, this type of research has exposed 
more complex gendering processes taking place within nationalisation and postcolonial 
political movements throughout countries in the global South where questions of 
intersectionality have been raised (Morrell and Swart 2005; Peterson 2007; Parpart 2008). 
It has also illustrated a diversity of oft-conflicting subject positions in groups of men, as 
well as identified how individuals are understood and how they understand and negotiate 
their own positions within particular gender orders.  
 
Pioneering writing by Fanon (1963), Said (1979), Spivak (1988) and Bhabha (2004) 
remain foundational in postcolonial analysis. These scholars developed an explanation of 
power, gender and racial order from the standpoint of the seemingly dispossessed living 
outside the Western sphere. For these scholars, global power configurations were shaped 
by the colonial encounters between the global North and their former colonies.viii  These 
authors and more contemporary ones such as Young, Agathangelou, Ling, Venn, Huddard 
and Chowdhury claim that in various forms and processes, colonialism has set the         
  
over-determined Eurocentric narrative of history whereby the ‘rest of the world is 
positioned as always in the process of catching up…always in process of casting off the 
obstacles of “arrested development” that prevent them from being “properly civilized”’ 
(Venn 2006). The postcolonial condition is more than a specific historical event or 
demarcation by a particular moment (Morrell and Swart 2005), and most scholars 
recognise that because there is no overarching natural authority for this Eurocentric 
narrative, it remains unstable. The instability of the narrative creates space for the 
seemingly disempowered colonised men and women to find agency in both resisting and 
transforming their current conditions of possibilities.  
 
DOMINATING MASCULINITIES: GIVING ‘WHITE’ SECURITY A HISTORY 
 
The archetypal security contract continues in the image of the white specially-trained 
Westerner. Yet, like the Gurkha, this image does not come into play without a history or an 
immediate relation to national and global politics in which its subjects find themselves. 
Private security has a long and contentious history, from its origins in Machiavelli, to ‘dogs 
of war’ in the 1970s throughout Africa and Latin America, to Executive Outcomes (EO) 
operations in the 1990s (Howe 1998) and now contemporary operations globally.  
Throughout the changes in security operations over the years, private security companies 
and contractors have proved to be both versatile and adaptable to their immediate 
geopolitical situations. Joachim and Schneiker (2012) along with Higate (2012a, 2012b) are 
a few key scholars who have documented the ‘mutable masculinities’ix this industry has 
performed in order to on the one hand continue to turn profits in the corporate sector and 
  
on the other map out a sense of professionalism for contractors on the ground. In both 
accounts the professional contractor continues to be seen as white and Western.  Within 
the dominant over-determined contractor archetype, there are two competing images: the 
self-fetishising hypermasculine contractor, who is often understood to be American, and 
the lower-profile masculine contractor, often understood to be British or of another 
Western nationality (Higate 2012a; Higate 2012b).   
 
The notion of the over–the-top, white, dominant, hypermasculine performance within the 
security industry finds support in accounts such as Schumacher’s (2006) A Bloody Business: 
America’s War Zone Contractors and the Occupation of Iraq. In this account, the security 
contractor subject is forced to operate rather autonomously with few amenities in hostile 
terrain. However, for many academic and journal writers, he is seen as dangerous and 
unnecessary.x (The alternative image is that of the level-headed contractor, illustrated in 
autobiographical-style books such as Shepherd’s (2008) The Circuit. For these men, 
maintaining a low profile and only reacting when absolutely necessary mitigates insecurity 
for their clients and themselves. Higate draws an interesting relational aspect to these 
seemingly dichotomous security subjects. Through his ethnographic research, he indicates 
that the cool-headed masculinity of the lower-profile contractor establishes his sense of 
professionalism in direct contrast to his counterpart over-the-top American contractor.  
The low-profile masculinity subject sees himself as ideal for the industry because he does 
not share his hypermasculine security subject’s attributes of being unprofessional and 
dangerous (Higate 2012a; 2012b). Yet these two dominating white masculinities rely on 
colonial logics that constitute and, at the same time, sustain their privileged position within 
  
the security industry. Here the non-white contractor is made silenced and indispensible:  
silenced because analysis into this racialised subject’s participation within the industry 
remains underdeveloped, and unacknowledged and indispensible because the security 
industry relies on his underpaid and unregulated labour.   
 
CONSTITUTING GURKHA: WHY HISTORIES AND MARTIAL RACE MATTER 
 
Gurkhas came to be understood and known to the West through their military 
engagements with the British and Indian militaries and through a process of martial race.xi 
Martial race was a part of a larger colonial project embedded in enlightenment thought and 
Victorian mania for scientific classifications; namely, that we can know, categorise and 
justify control over people with the use of science (Parsons 1999; Khalidi 2001-2002).  
Implicating military anthropologists and scientists alike in these projects, men were 
measured, weighed and assessed based on ideas of sexual prowess, martial performances 
and cultural heritage (Tucker 1957; Caplan 1995; Khalidi 2001-2002).   
 
Martial races were more than just racialised stereotypes whereby the coloniser drew on 
cheap and trustworthy soldiers to fight their wars. The discourses also justified why some 
races and people were more destined to conquer and rule than others (Khalidi 2001-2002; 
Saint-Aubin 2005: 24). In regards to India, martial race was a strategy that the British 
military advocated after the Sepoy Mutiny (Coleman 1999; Khalidi 2001-2002; Bullock 
2009). In the mutiny, the higher-caste Indians serving with the British ignited an armed 
resistance against the British whilst the Gurkhas maintained their commitment and loyalty 
  
to the British Empire. It was during this mutiny that Gurkhas solidified their loyal and 
brave status amongst British military soldiers—a status that is celebrated today in both the 
British and Indian militaries (Khalidi 2001-2002). Importantly, martial race was not a  top-
down process where the Gurkha was relegated to the position of passive recipient. The 
projects resulted in significant social transformation within Nepalese domestic spheres 
(Tucker 1957; Saint-Aubin 2005). Men recruited as Gurkhas by the British were able to 
increase their economic and social capital, leading to grassroots development projects in 
their local communities as well as the gaining of personal wealth in Nepal (Caplan 1995; 
Saint-Aubin 2005).   
 
The ‘fierce warrior’ attribute founded in their martial race has also led to the desirability of 
Gurkhas on the open market and in many respects have afforded Nepalese men 
opportunities to continue to engage in labour outside their country, albeit in dangerous 
spaces. Vines (1999) details the Gurkhas’ role as martial men in private security in Sierra 
Leone and Angola in the 1990s. In Vines’s discussion, Gurkhas did not appear to be merited 
on their individual attributes but rather grouped together as a ‘fierce warrior’ race (Vines 
1999: 123), with some claiming them to be above the skill and natural aptitude of any 
white Western or local contractor, whilst others claiming them deficient. Overall, Gurkhas 
were and continue to be understood through their martial race and natural attributes as 
warriors.  
 
‘BETTER TO DIE THAN BE A COWARD’: UNDERSTANDING OF SELF AS GURKHA 
  
All the Gurkhas I interviewed shared similar understandings of what it meant to be a 
Gurkha. For them, the term ‘Gurkha’ was most associated with honesty, integrity, bravery, 
loyalty and discipline. In an interview with Kavindra, he described Gurkhas’ attributes and 
renown: 
 
We are known [as] the Gurkhas all over the world, which you have heard and seen 
in Singapore, Britain, Brunei and India… Peoples understand [the Gurkha] as loyalty, 
honestly honorable and discipline.  The Gurkhas are very well mannered, very good 
person, very energetic; whatever instructions come down from higher we will obey. 
 
Not only are honor and discipline prominent in Kavindra’s description of the Gurkha, he 
also points out the subordinate mindset and absolute commitment to following orders 
from higher-ups as integral to being a Gurkha. Here, a Gurkha is understood to be 
disciplined and ready to follow commands. Barat, Kitendra and Fabien shared a similar 
view.  Adding to Kavindra’s descriptions, these men commented that 
 
nowadays we are using Gurkha, our surname, like we are proud we are 
Gurkha…because it is a word of honor and bravery…mostly Gurkhas are very 
honesty and very brave, that’s all Gurkhas, people don’t know his name but people 
say he’s very honest and a brave man, full of discipline. They say Gurkhas is a man of 
bravery. 
 
  
In both responses, discipline and bravery were key social attributes in understanding what 
it means to these men to be a Gurkha. Conversely, it was made clear to me that not all 
Nepalese men are Gurkhas. For Barat, a Gurkha needed to have specific military/police 
service background and international experience.  He stated that ‘those who are serving in 
the Nepal military, they are not a real Gurkha. Mostly they call me a Gurkha because I work 
overseas’. (In Barat’s opinion, having overseas experience (such as time spent in the 
Singaporean Police, Indian Army or British Military) is the factor that determines who is a 
real Gurkha.    
 
While Kajividra agreed with Barat’s understanding of Gurkhas, he also argued that there 
was something specific in manners that could be used to differentiate them from their 
Nepalese civilian counterparts. Discipline also remains an important distinguishing factor:   
 
All the Nepalese are not the Gurkhas. You can find out whether they are civilian or 
Gurkhas from the way they talk to you or certain manners. Normally Gurkhas will 
respect you very well and they will talk to you very politely. Civilians have different 
types of characters. They can talk very politely but you can easily find out.  There 
will be slight differences. This is the way to know from their discipline and from 
they way they dress up.  
 
Becoming a Gurkha in Nepal is viewed by these men as a source of pride for both the 
prestige and economic stability it affords. Not only does it pay well, the actual recruitment 
process is gruelling and takes several months to complete, with a low pass rate for both the 
  
British and Indian militaries (Barat , Mohan). The competitive nature of the process, along 
with the financial benefits associated with being a Gurkha, continues to make it a highly 
sought profession. These reasons underpin Barat’s desire to become a Gurkha:   
 
My friends want to join the British army and then I was 17 and I hoped that I would 
too. We always used to talk about it. These [Gurkhas] come back from Malay and they 
come back to Nepal and they had a good life and a good job. My father and uncle said 
British army and I asked my uncle if I can join but he said to study first. He 
encouraged me to join the Singapore police. It is a long job and I can serve for 35 
years.  So I can work for a long time and get a good pension. 
 
For Barat and his family, education was important as it provided new economic 
opportunities. Because of this, he was encouraged to study before becoming a Gurkha.  
When Barat decided that the education route was not appropriate for him, as he claimed 
not to have the right aptitude, he expressed the desire to become a Gurkha because of the 
economic stability and international travel it offered. However, for Murhan, becoming a 
Gurkha had always been his ultimate goal. He wanted to follow the tradition of his Gurkha 
father and grandfather, but also sought the attendant status one achieves in Nepal. Murhan 
stated that ‘once you have been selected in the final selection [to become a Gurkha], you 
will become a hero’.  
 
All the men shared stories of pride and local esteem associated with being a Gurkha in 
Nepal. Interestingly, most of the men interviewed continued to follow colonial logics, 
  
reinforcing the white Westerner as the ideal security contractor. The closer a Gurkha could 
mimic the Westerner in security, the higher status he felt he would achieve. This then 
highlighted a subgroup of Gurkhas expressed throughout the interviews. Those 
interviewed claimed the Indian Gurkha was not as good as the Singaporean Police Gurkha 
because he did not have the same competency in English (the standard Western language 
used in security). Moreoever, the Indian Gurkha was not a specialist trained to the British 
standard and did not have the international experience as those Gurkhas who worked with 
the British military or Singaporean police. Barat, Fabien and Kitendra all further argued 
that the Singaporean Police Gurkha was not as highly skilled for security contract work as 
the British Gurkha because he did not have the necessary military experience in hostile 
environments or the specific training from the British military. 
 
In the interview with Barat, Kitendra and Fabien, Barat commented that ‘the British do 
more training, so the training side, very very good in British’. Kitendra supported this 
remark by stating that ‘they [the Indians] are better in battlefield, but tactically the British 
are more good because they have more training and newer equipment’. Pay was also 
considered important in determining hierarchy amongst Gurkhas. Fabien further claimed 
that British Gurkhas are of high esteem because  
 
they got the salary and then when they come back to Nepal their salary is high. Also 
they want to go to Europe and see and experience the lifestyle of Europe. India is our 
neighbour; we can go there whenever.   
 
  
The esteem associated with British Gurkhas had to do with pay, specialist training and the 
ability to travel and experience international communities. Rabindra supported Fabien’s 
viewpoint but also highlighted the tradition within his own family as an important 
motivator for becoming a British Gurkha:   
 
First of all my dream was to join the British army.  Since I was small I have been 
seen my seniors, my grandfather and my uncles.  They were from the British army 
and they were having a good life and so I got some inspiration from them and I tried 
to join the British army and now I joined the Indian army. 
 
Rabindra’s desire to initially join the British military illustrates the overall sense of 
exceptionalism as well as hierarchy of subclassifications of Gurkha that emerged through 
these interviews. Most men interviewed first had aspirations for British training, then 
Singaporean training; only upon failing that would they become an Indian Gurkha. Despite 
this hierarchy, all the Gurkhas I interviewed claimed to share common traits and could 
easily be identified from their Nepalese civilian or police counterparts who did not share 
their same discipline and loyalty.  
 
Additionally, those interviewed tended to draw on the brave and fierce imagery of the 
Gurkha in order to cope with dangerous incidents they encountered in their private 
security work. When I asked Baharder how he felt about performing dangerous tasks in 
Afghanistan, he stated that ‘we are already Gurkhas and this is how they [our forefathers] 
got their name’. Baharder continued, invoking the Gurkha motto. ‘It is better to die than to 
  
be a coward. We are also afraid of dangerous things but we have to still put the name 
Gurkha forward and do these dangerous jobs. Because my grandfather and father have 
done this so we have to’. Drawing upon the deeply-rooted history of his name and the 
attendant desire to avoid tarnishing its reputation, Baharder accepted most tasks given to 
him by his employer. Barat also spoke of drawing upon this idea of Gurkha bravery during 
an ambush of his vehicle convoy in Iraq:  
 
I heard a Columbian supervisor was killed instantly. The camp was not very far 
away, just one kilometer. When we got on the road again the vehicle wasn’t moving 
that fast. So the tire was hit but we couldn’t go. I had to fix the tire so we could move. 
At that time I feel that we are the Gurkha, that we have no fear. Don’t worry about 
this...we know we are here, this is a war zone country. If you wish to do the job you 
have to do it. 
 
I continued to hear various stories of Gurkha bravery and courage in the face of danger 
without support or amenities. While I was in Nepal at a Gurkha friend’s family meal, 
Kivindra, a retired British Gurkha and uncle of my friend, explained to me how upon losing 
his team during a private security operation, he was forced to cross through remote and 
hostile areas of Angola. He had only the clothing he was wearing and his rifle to get to 
safety. While Kivindra was telling this story, others were laughing. They all claimed that 
this is what a Gurkha will do in the face of adversity.   
 
 It is clear through the interviews that for these men, being a Gurkha meant that they were 
  
able to provide financially for themselves and their families.  More importantly, being 
Gurkha also provided a valuable sense of history and pride and was held in high esteem in 
their local communities. The Gurkha identity gave them comfort and strength in the 
physically dangerous situations they encountered in their private security work. While 
their martial history and Gurkha identity provide them with esteem and a sense of 
belonging, these men still have to contend with their subordinate status in the international 
security market.   
 
‘ALMOST BUT NOT WHITE’: UNDERSTANDING RELATIONS WITH WESTERNERS 
 
Mohan, a former British Gurkha whom I spent considerable time with while in Nepal, 
continuously poked fun at the colonial relationship with the British. On one such occasion, 
we were at the British Gurkha museum in Pokhara when we were looking at old black and 
white framed photos of Gurkhas alongside their British officer. In the photos the British 
officer and Gurkhas stood side by side; their immediate height and physical size difference 
was apparent. Randhoj laughed as he looked at these images with me. He recalled a story 
about a Gurkha British officer who came to visit a Gurkha community with his wife. When 
all the Gurkha men lined up in military formation adorned with their ceremonial uniforms 
and kukris, the wife of the Gurkha officer commented on how ‘cute’ these men were. At this 
point Mohan paused, deepening his voice to impersonate the Gurkha officer responding to 
his wife by saying, ‘Do not touch the Gurkha’. Mohan then laughed and repeated ‘do not 
touch the Gurkha’ again in his staged deep voice. His story highlights his acknowledgement 
  
of the irony of the incongruent colonial logics of Gurkhas being both cute and something to 
be respected and feared. 
 
This incongruent narrative persists in contemporary security operations. The notion of the 
ideal white contractor juxtaposed with his almost but not quite racialised Gurkha 
counterpart was both reinforced and disputed in my interviews with and observations of 
white managers and Gurkhas. Most white managers I interviewed throughout my time in 
Afghanistan stated that Gurkhas were considered better than local contractors at adapting 
to Western culture. They were also in a good position to linguistically and culturally 
communicate with local Afghans. Because of their cultural hybridity in their ability to relate 
to both locals and internationals, Gurkhas were positioned higher in the hierarchy of 
security contractors than Afghans—yet not on the same level as white contractors. 
Interviews with three white security managers revealed their belief that Gurkhas lack the 
specialist skills and cultural competencies held by white contractors that allow them to 
assume higher-paying roles in the industry. 
 
Some Gurkhas further reinforced these colonial logics themselves. For example, Murat 
stated that they needed the British and Western men to train them to become professional 
soldiers/contractors. Fabien too reinforced colonial relations by stating that while being a 
Gurkha was in his blood, he continues to need assistance from the British in order to move 
from a natural warrior to a professional soldier/contractor. Murat further claimed that 
Westerners have more international experience and better communication skills, 
education and confidence, which justifies their dominant role in the industry. All of the 
  
Gurkhas interviewed stated that the British colonial encounter with their ancestors was an 
integral moment in shaping their identities as Gurkhas and invariably their understandings 
of self remain linked to the British.  
 
While the interviewees largely reinforced the discursive differences between Westerners 
and Gurkhas, the material disparities that resulted from this discursive difference did not 
receive the same amount of support. In particular, Fabien stated that  
 
I don’t know why there is such a big difference in pay and living.  Sometimes ya I 
know the British are well educated than us and are more professional than us and in 
that case the salary could be different but in some cases Nepalese are talented and 
educated but even they are not getting that salary. 
 
When asked how it was working with Westerners and with various security companies, 
Rabindra commented on the material differences, sharing a view similar to Fabien’s: 
 
It is fine, not bad but there is also huge discrimination between expats [Westerners] 
and TCNs in the salary and also the living and clothing is different, like the expats 
used to stay in one person, one room and we are staying in one room for five to six 
people. There is different dining and different food and different drinks.  Whatever 
food that is in the kitchen [the Westerners] can take whenever they want but we 
cannot. We have specific times. Always one food, same meal every day, will not 
change. 
  
 
The Gurkhas who did not completely accept the colonial logics of difference in living and 
working conditions were also frustrated over their inability to do anything about their 
immediate situation. Rabindra expressed his sense of resignation: ‘I feel bad, but what to 
do?’ He claimed he could not raise concerns because ‘if you do you will be kicked out’. Many 
Gurkhas appeared to have an overall frustration with the structure of global private 
security and their lack of agency within this structure. Rabindra commented that 
 
the security companies are getting the contracts because of the Gurkha.  They 
convince their clients that we are good but we have been cheated by these same 
companies. This is because they are using your name and yet you are treated 
completely different.  
 
Security companies market Gurkhas as highly esteemed contractors who are an ideal 
solution to expensive Westerners. Yet upon contracting Gurkhas, companies appear to 
treat them as second class to their Western counterparts. This incongruence in the 
marketing of Gurkhas and their subsequent treatment within operations frustrated 
Rabindra: 
 
I don’t want to complain about the salary but at least lodging and food should be fair.  
We don’t say salary must be equal with the Europeans and Americans because their 
living expenses is higher but in our country you can survive…in the case of lodging 
and food, all the facilities should be fair. Because we are working the same work… for 
  
example, I used to work in airport and my team was one Gurkha and one is expat and 
we are doing the same work but they are getting 15,000 dollars and I am getting 
1,700 dollars. 
 
Not all the men interviewed openly expressed this frustration over the difference in pay 
and living conditions. Barat talked about being with a company who takes good care of him. 
Yet Barat’s story appeared to be exceptional within those of the men interviewed.  Overall, 
a general feeling emerged amongst the interviewees that while they accepted the Western 
standard within the security industry as the ideal, they did not understand why this 
justified the substantial disparities in pay and living conditions. 
 
It is difficult to discern how much of this racial hierarchy spoken of and reinforced by 
Gurkha men is due to their military or colonial socialisation with the white Westerner. In 
reality, the two cannot be separated. Certainly, however, their training and relationship 
with the British military and their own history and understanding of self is still heavily 
embedded in colonial logics. When I asked Gurkha men in individual interviews to describe 
the history of Gurkhas, they all stated that it originated with the British. To most men 
interviewed, the British military brought the Gurkha into being. Additionally, these men 
reinforced the notion of the white security contractor as the ideal in the industry, but 
continued to question whether this archetype actually justified the vast material 
differences between Gurkhas and white Westerners.     
 
MOVING MARGINS: GURKHAS TRANSFORMING CONDITIONS OF POSSIBILITIES  
  
 
Racialised contractors within the security industry must accommodate more hardship than 
others. This accommodation is seen in the living and working conditions these men sign 
onto—Agthangelou and Ling (2009: 89) highlight the ingenuity that people at the margins 
have historically displayed. Here the Gurkhas I interviewed engaged or struck a bargain 
(Sa’ar 2005) with neoliberal markets in the hopes of obtaining a better material existence 
and fulfilling the social obligations back home of financially assisting their families and 
extended families. Some men’s participation went beyond mere financial gain in their 
investment in the martial self-perception of being Gurkha. Identifying as Gurkha gave them 
a proud history as well as strength in adverse or dangerous situations they encountered.  
 
How Gurkhas understand their own representations and reasons for striking this bargain 
with an industry with rests on their marginal status is far from simple.xii Gurkhas use what 
they can to achieve their goal of a better life. For one group of interviewees, this came at a 
further commodification of their martial race. This self-commodification was sustained 
through adopting martial logics in understanding their role within the industry and seeing 
Gurkha as more of a calling than an individual choice. From another group, the narrative 
that emerged was a realisation of the paradoxical and unstable nature of their 
representations. Participating in the industry was a short-term sacrifice to support long-
term educational gains for their children and the hopes of increasing their families’ 
opportunities.   
 
  
For the former self-conceptualisation, the interviewees stated that there was something 
exceptional about their martial status. Some opined that white men had to be trained 
whereas the Gurkha already had natural attributes which only had to be harnessed. The 
Gurkhas could use the skills from their white mentors, but the white men could never have 
the natural warrior spirit that was in the Gurkha bloodline (Muran). Their masculinities 
were wrapped in an understanding of self based upon a personal perception as warrior-
like, owing to a natural physical strength and mental courage in battle—something written 
about extensively in Gurkha officer memoirs (Cross and Gurung 2007; Parker 1999).  
 
The latter group saw the security industry as something short-term and as a sacrifice that 
they wanted to end with them. In one such interview, Barat spoke at length about the 
importance of education in order to open up opportunities for young men and women:   
 
Without education you cannot get anything. If you can’t study, you don’t have a 
future… So what I did for my children I did a time set. You come from school, you 
have to eat, then you have to study, and I always check their homework and their 
bags to make sure they are good. I always go to see their teachers and the principal 
to see how they are doing. 
 
For Barat, achieving a high education, instead of becoming a Gurkha, meant a better 
material life because it affords more opportunities in the global economy. Education was 
the tool required to better take care of one’s family and community financially. He 
expressed that he wanted all his children to achieve this high education. Kavindra also 
  
stated that ‘in the future if I have a son, I would put emphasis on the study side, not the 
military side’. For both Kavindra and Barat, their focus was more on the economic benefits 
of being a Gurkha—and a sacrifice that they did not wish their children to repeat.    
 
For other interviewees still, Gurkha identities were somewhere in the middle of a realised, 
commodified construction and something inherently biological. Several of the men I 
interviewed would tell me that they were proud of their Gurkha service and would boast 
about being a part of a particular regiment. Those interviewed, such as Baharder and 
Randhoj, used their identity as Gurkhas to justify much of their contemporary security 
roles, which took them to dangerous parts of Afghanistan and afforded them few comforts. 
According to Baharder, Gurkhas were brave and hearty and were the best contractor for 
this type of work. They were happy that they could do a job they were both proud of and 
good at. They did not necessarily see being a Gurkha as something in their blood, but 
something that reflected a long and important history in their own family or community. 
Finally, being a Gurkha gave some of these men a personal history and a solid sense of self.  
Baharder stated that because his father and grandfather both served as Gurkhas, he felt 
destined to become one also. Whilst the concept of ‘Gurkha’ may have had its origins in  
constructed colonial imagery, those interviewed believe that it was their obligation to 
continue the Gurkha reputation through their conduct in military and private security 
service.   
 
Most of the men whom I interviewed in Pokhara, Nepal in May 2010, would tell me that 
they had three careers.. The first was with the military, the second with private security 
  
and the third in community development. The first two jobs were to ensure that they could  
economically provide for their families, sending their children to school abroad and 
assuring that their parents, children and communities were otherwise financially 
supported. Both these careers took them away from their families and community 
networks for considerable amounts of time and were considered to be a sacrifice. The third 
career could begin largely once their children had been educated and these men could 
settle into communities with their extended families and friends. Those interviewed were 
building cooperative banks, grocery stores and networking for other business 
opportunities. This third career was that in which most of the retired Gurkhas I 
interviewed in Nepal took the most pride. These three careers are markers of the Gurkhas’ 
understanding of their own martial histories and the transformative ways in which they 
remake this history and rebuild their communities.  
 
Throughout my research I found that Gurkhas are defining and claiming their colonial 
history as well as seeking transformative ways to change this history. They do this by 
creating more opportunities for their sons and daughters through international education 
as well as by directly investing in their own communities. What these examples reinforce is 
that far from being the victims of their colonial histories or even serving as the stereotyped 
ideal of the loyal and trustworthy soldier, these men are active agents, each transforming 
their conditions of possibilities and the futures for their families in different ways.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
  
Scholarship investigating private security continues to focus on the normative and 
regulatory practices of these security companies and how they are changing our 
understanding of international security. Out of this scholarship, little attention is dedicated 
to the racial and gender implications of these operations and to date, there has been little 
discussion as to how subaltern men within the industry make sense of the gender 
hierarchies amongst security contractors. Research on masculinities in private security 
tends to glorify and normalise white masculinities. Failing to engage with the ways in 
which colonial histories constitute contemporary security practises aids in the 
perpetuation of hegemonic masculinities within private security, and  the archetype of 
security contractors remains white and Western. Yet, as emerging journalistic and 
scholastic research indicates, these men remain both silenced and indispensable: silenced 
because their narrative is often overlooked, and indispensable because they provide 
cheaper alternatives to costly Western contractors and perform more menial and 
dangerous contractual work.  
 
Most Gurkhas interviewed understand the structural inequalities that being a Gurkha in 
private security brings, but they also willingly serve as a part of the industry, each 
rationalising their own role with the improvement of the opportunities for their children. 
Gurkhas continue to contest and negotiate their own martial masculinities in order to 
maximise their life trajectories. Some Gurkhas do this by completely rejecting their 
martiality, and some by further exploiting their own reputations in order to garner more 
contracts in the industry.  
 
  
Most men I interviewed claimed to want more for their children beyond seeking military 
opportunities. Their desire for alternative choices for their sons and daughters might also 
be due to their awareness that annual recruitment of Gurkhas into the British military is 
consistently being scaled down and so the opportunities for their children to enlist might 
be limited in the future.   
 
However, this is not to say that martial identity appears to be weakening in Nepal for 
Gurkhas. So long as there are economic and social incentives, there are young Nepalese 
men signing up on a daily basis to take on these identities—even if they continue to 
participate only in a limited role. Exploring the history of this process and how Gurkhas 
make sense of their history allows one to problematise the privilege and hidden whiteness 
embedded in racial masculinities and examine the transformative ways Gurkhas construct 
their own identities.  
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i The literature centres around concerns over regulations (Howe 1998; Cilliers and Mason 
1999; Muthein and Taylor 2002; Ortiz 2004; De Nevers 2009), appropriateness of private 
versus public security providers (Brooks 2001; Carafano 2008; Mandel 2001; Perry 2007; 
Rasor and Bauman 2007), the normative and legal challenges with employing private 
forces in insecure spaces (Carmola 2004; Bures 2005; Leander 2005; Bicanic and Bourque 
2006; Percy 2007, 2009) and the larger concerns linking Privatised Security Companies 
(PSC) to neoliberal governance agendas (Lock 1999; Drohan 2003; Leander 2006).  
ii I understand the problematic, crude and somewhat misleading use of the ‘global North’ 
and ‘global South’.  Yet, like Morrell and Swart (2005), I contend that the world continues to 
bear marks of colonialism and these are seen in the particular geographic tropes used to 
divide up the world.  For ease of reference I use ‘global South’ to refer to the less 
industrialised regions of the world which the security industry exploits for cheaper labour.  
The ‘global North’ refers to the more industrialised nations where the ideal white security 
contractor, security company owners and the client of security come from.   
iii Sherman and Di Domenico 2009; Vines 1999; Maclellan 2007; Barker 2009; Higate 2009; 
2012c; Stillman 2011. 
iv A plethora of books which describe the Gurkha in exotic and martial terms can be found 
through a simple internet search.  Some books include J.P. Cross and Gurung B. Gurkha’s At 
War: Eyewitness Accounts from World War II to Iraq (Greenhill Books, 2002);  J. Parker’s  
The Gurkhas: The Inside Story of the World’s Most Feared Soldiers (Headline Book 
Publishing, 1999); and C. Bullock’s Britain’s Gurkhas (Third Millennium Publishing, 2009).  
v Connell 1987; Morgan 1992; Hearn 1998; Morrell and Swart 2005; Parpart 2008. 
vi Razack 2004; Tickner 2004; Peterson 2007; McKelvey 2007; Parpart and Zalewski 2008. 
vii Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992; Hearn 1998; Higate et al. 2003; Hutchings 2008; Archer 
2001; Hooper 2001; McKelvey 2007; Elias and Beasley 2009. 
viii Like the global North, the West is ‘a name always associating itself with those regions, 
communities, and people that appear politically or economically superior in other regions, 
communities and peoples’ (Sakai 1998, in Charkrabarty 2000: 3).  
ix ‘Mutable masculinities’ is a concept derived from Higate when discussing how security 
contractors adapt to their particular geopolitical environments.  
x Singer 2003; Leander 2005; Kinsey 2006; Rasor and Bauman 2007; Travernise and Glanz 
2007; Percy 2009; Sherman and DiDomenico 2009; Vardi 2009.   
xi Enloe 1980; Caplan 1995; Khalidi 2001-2002; Streets 2003; Golay 2006. 
xii Sa’ar defines liberal bargain as a process where men are appropriated into the economic 
system that rests on their ultimate exclusion. In this bargain, men and women, constituted 
at the margins of their political/economic spheres, strategise with whatever they have to 
allow them to at least engage.  It is the hope that through this engagement they can 
eventually move more into the centre of the economy.  This bargain is sustained by some 
exceptional situations where marginal men improve their conditions of possibilities by 
actually adopting liberal economic logics.   
